1.
Childhood – middle class childhood – is, among other things,
an education in secrets. Secret making and breaking. A paper by Yves de la
Taille on the development of “the right
to a secret” among children cites researchers in the Piagetian school claiming
that children develop a conception of secrecy around four years of age. I
wonder if that has changed as we’ve plugged our kids into youtube and other internety
business. I vaguely remember an Oswald the Octopus episode about a secret,
which amused Adam in his toddler days.
I don’t think the secret begins as a peer to peer, sibling
to sibling or playmate to playmate toy. Parents take great pleasure in making
secrets part of kidlife. What would a present be if it isn’t wrapped – if it
isn’t the subject of hints – if it isn’t hidden, after it is bought, in the
parental closet or workroom? The present needs to be presented in the wrapping
because the wrapping is the charisma of the gift. You tear it off, and you
guessed right or wrong.
Gifts and guessing, that long bourgeois couple. It will
outlast the love marriage.
2.
Secrets and secret societies play an abnormally large role
in Georg Simmel’s theory of socialization. Consciousness itself is under the
law of the secret. Self-consciousness is not only consciousness that I think,
it is consciousness that you don’t know what I think. The cogito comes out as a
sly devil, a hider. Epistemology must first deal with secrets and their
breaking before we get to the other stuff. I know what I think as I talk to
some Other, even while I am talking, and the Other can project this on me since
the Other does the same thing. I can, of course, say what I think, but the phrase,
“can I be frank,” or “can I tell you what I think” derives its affective sense
from the fact that I don’t always, and in fact almost never, tell you what I
think entirely. I edit for you. And thank God you edit for me. I’m uniquely
equipped to do this, beyond the lie detector’s reach – which of course depends
on physiological signs, and doesn’t really measure what’s held back – because I
know my secret self. Which is my self, the one I take to the toilet, the
shower, the bed. The intimacy here is, formally, a secret, and it is within
that secret that all the variables of memory and sense hide. This secret distinguishes
me from the Other, and the Other has its secret, and we exist as secret sharers
side by side, or in traffic, or as fan to celebrity, lover to love, aging
parent to child. We live in secret and we die that way. Here, it really is a
matter of until death do you part. Or as Simmel puts it, this is the “deeply
grounded circle of mental life.
Yet, such is the power and attraction of exposing oneself
that it is a rare individual who goes about making a mystery of himself. The
escaped convict, the confidence man, the revolutionary, the knight of faith –
all do trail mysteries, but all are out of the mainstream. When Simmel published his Soziologie.
Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung, the mystery man in
literature was in fashion. Hamsun wrote Hunger in 1890 and Mysteries
in 1892, which had a tremendous influence on German literature, at least. Dostoevski’s
The Possessed, published as Die Dämonen, was published in German
translation in 1906. Les Caves du Vatican, Gide’s novel with its scene
of the l’acte gratuity – Lafcadio’s murder of his seatmate on the train – was an
act that was a mystery even to its perpetrator.
In this atmosphere – the nervous crisis of the European
intellectual – putting the secret and the secret sharer as a whole chapter of
the large book on sociology made sense. For Simmel, the internal secrecy of the
consciousness was anything but a logical choice – it was a choice forced upon
the subject by natural history. The secret (which is and is not the
unconscious) is distinct as a form from the logic and reason that may advantage
a person who wants to keep a secret. Simmel, living before the wireless, compares
what happens in the mind of the socialized subject to a treebranch that is
entangled in a telegraph wire, causing it to send out messages every time the
wind blows. It “leaves signs that give us a reasonable sense” – but that are
ultimately caused by something other than the sense. “If one looks at ideas as
they continually flow in a time series through our consciousness, this
flickering, zigzagging collision of images and ideas … is far distant from
reasonable normativity.”
We are idiots babe. It’s a wonder that we still know how to
breathe. Which is the expressionist message.
3.
In one of his essays, Louis Marin speaks of a certain book
of traps, written by a 16th century Venetian. What an evocative title that is!
Traps, spies and secrets have always fascinated me.
The secret itself – which tends fatally to the scenario of
the trap - has not, for some reason, been a large topic in philosophy since Simmel,
even though it is certainly a
conceptually involuted trope. It has been replaced, I think, with the problem
of the unconscious.
My approach to the secret takes it that there are two broad secret types. First
order secrets are those in which the content of the secret is secret, while the
form (that is, that there is a secret there) is not; this is the usual type
that is treated in the literature, both fictional and factual. We have, for
instance, an intelligence agency and we know that it has put under lock and key
documents about X. In this case, we know that X is secret. It is our minimal
knowledge, but it is in itself non-secret knowledge. As well, our knowledge
that the secret is being kept is public knowledge.
Sometimes, an institution will insert an ambiguity in that
knowledge by saying that they can neither confirm or deny X. This is a step
towards the second order secret. These are secret in which both the content and
the form are secret.
For instance, you have a friend who, it turns out, is a murderer.
The secret here is both that he is a murderer and that you never suspected he
had a secret. I’ve often thought that if, somewhere, there really was a man who
shot at Kennedy from the grassy knoll, and he kept that a secret all his life,
it would form an interesting novelistic problem. How would you portray that
secret keeping as the interesting novelistic theme without violating the secret
– that is, approaching the life with an unsourced knowledge that the man had
this secret? This would be possible only if something after the man died
indicated that this man was the shooter on the grassy knoll. But if you told
the tale from this “leak” of information, you would be starting out from a
desublimated place; and the whole sublimity of the story is the fact that such
a non-secret murder was effected by a man who kept it secret his entire life.
Secrets have a sublimity. A paranoid sublimity. To keep it secret that you have a secret is to
be an agent within a paranoid narrative.
The rough division of secrets does not really give us the
essence of secrets, but it is a start.
I once dreamed of a novel in which this second order of
secrecy forms the core. Unfortunately, to tell the tale is to violate the core.
You might think this is a trivial distinction, but actually, it is the
distinction that informs the relationship between secrecy and political power.
We know, for instance, that the CIA holds back information from American
citizens - we know that they have secrets. The
peculiar status of the CIA depends on our knowing that they know what we dont
know in much the same way that the Minister D., in the Purloined Letter,
holds sway over the Queen because she knows that he possesses a letter that she
doesn’t want the king to know about. The queen’s secret, then, is a second order secret, while D’s is a first
order secret. Second order secrets are often such as to make their possessor
vulnerable, while first order secrets are often of the type to make their
possessor powerful. This generalization obviously has some very important
exceptions, but when it comes, at least, to Intelligence agencies in the U.S.,
it holds true.
In fact I once dreamed of writing a little spy novel- the notes for which are
in some box or other in somebody’s closet-
in which the premise was that the real US Intelligence agency was the asphalt
testing division of the US Department of Highways and Transportation, while the
CIA and the NSA were shells. That was a sort of joke. It is funny because, of
course, we think of the CIA, etc., as powerful, and even romantic, because we
know they operate in secret, whereas asphalt testing has no James Bond-ian
resonance. The charisma of the wrapper is on one, but not on the other.
Parents little think of what they are teaching their child
with that first wrapped present.